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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THEON MERRILL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. 19204 
vs. 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE LOWER COURT. 
It is well settled that there are no grounds for an 
award of attorney's fees absent a statutory or contractual 
basis therefore. 
Devore v. Bostrom , 632 P.2d 832, 835, (Utah 1981). 
Defendants have not urged a statutory basis and the lower 
court desired their contractual attempt. This is within the 
sound discretion of that Court. The standard of reveiw or 
reversal established by caselaw, is not met. Absent patent 
error or clear abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial 
court will not be disturbed. Alexander v. Brown , 646 p.2d 
692, 695, (Utah 1982); Beckstrom v. Beckstrom , 578 P.2d 
529, (Utah 1978). 
It being established in the above cases that the denial 
of attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the 
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trial judge, the standard of patent error or abuse need only 
be defined. The Utah Supreme Court has proven to be 
extremely reluctant to reverse a denial of fees* Consider, 
e,gM McCarren v. Merrill , 15 Ut.2d 179, 389 P.2d 732, 
(1964), in which this Court affirmed the lower court's 
failure to award attorney's fees provided for in a contract 
even though Plaintiff had successfully recovered the 
reasonable value of his services thereunder. See also the 
cases cited at 56 A.L.Fed. 871. The trial judge in this case 
had the clear power to deny an award of fees, and his 
dicision should not be overruled. 
B. ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE IMPROPER IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS HAVE TERMINATED 
CONTRACTUAL BASUS UNDER WHICH THEY SEEK 
TO RECOVER. 
Since there must be a statutory or contractual basis for 
an award of attorney's fees, Defendants must lose their 
claim. Their efforts are akin to that in Devore v. Supra , 
in which the Court noted that a party could not repudicate 
part of a contract yet attempt to assert the provisions 
beneficial to itsel*f, at 834. 
It is clear that the remedy sought by Defendants is the 
termination of the Producer's Contract. Consider Points III 
and IV of Respondent's brief which urge the lawful and 
justifiable termination of that same contract through which 
they seek to recover attorney's fees. (See also page one in 
which they concur with the trial court's determination of a 
lawful terminiation.) Such termination was attempted by the 
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acts of the Defendants, not Plaintiff. Despite any 
disingenuous claims by Defendants that they have sought to 
enforce the Producer's Contract, what they are attempting to 
do is illegally punish Plaintiff while having him pay for the 
privilege. 
Indeed, the very terms of Paragraph VI of the Agreement 
provide that attorney's fees are to be awarded only in an 
action for an enforcement of the agreement, not a recission. 
Thus, a condition precedent for attorney's fees is not met. 
In BLT Inv, Co. v. Snow , 586 P.2d 456, (Utah 1978), 
this Court held in a like situation that a recission 
extinguishes a contract so effectively it never at any 
existence, at 458, Citing 767 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and 
Purchaser, Sec. 602 and Bodenhamer v. Patterson , 278 Or. 
367, 563 P.2d 1212 (1977), the Court stated: 
By asking for a recission of the contract, they 
disaffirmed it in its entirety. They may not 
avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim 
the benefit of the provision for attorney's fees. 
Because the condition precedent of "enforcing" the 
contract is not met, and for the equitable reason that 
Defendant may not terminate the contract yet enforce its 
punitive provisions, the request for attorney's fees should 
be denied. 
II. THE ISSUE IS NOT MOOTED BY ANOTHER INVALID 
TERMINATION. 
Defendants claim that a subsequent notice of termination 
served during the contractually provided period moots this 
appeal, citing Technicians of Utah, Inc. v. Board of Salt 
-3-
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i 
Lake County Commissioners, et. al , No. 17960, filed 8/18/83. 
The cases are inapposite. In Technicians , the cities j 
involved, apparently deciding to drip their appeal, deferred 
to a state law pre-empting their ordinances and thus mooting 
their appeals. In this case, Defendants attempt to do twice j 
what Plaintiff seeks to have this Court tell them they could 
not do once. 
Plaintiff's stance is contrary to the assertion on page ^ 
6 of Defendant's brief that the contract does not require 
"cause" for termination. Plaintiff's entire brief is based 
on the incorporation of all the Articles, by-laws, and rules -
and regulations of the association into the Producer's 
Agreement, (TR-188, Article XV of the Agreement.) This 
incorporation is based on the agreement itself as well as
 ( 
public policy reasons. 
Needless to say, should this Court determine that 
"cause" is a condition of a termination, neither alleged • 
termination is valid. Defendant's June 2, 1983 termination 
notice (Exhibit A to Respondent's Brief), does not even 
attempt to establish a justification, stating merely, perhaps
 ( 
questionably, that the action is unrelated to prior 
disagreements between the parties. This Court should not 
allow such a transparent ploy to subvert it from finding that 
Plaintiff's contract rights were illegally terminated, or 
from enforcing its opinion upon Defendants. 
III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE 
LOWER COURT WAS PROPER. 
If this Court determines in favor of Plaintiff's 
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membership rights in Defendant Association, then a true issue 
of mootness is presented, and the injunction need not be 
considered. 
However, it is not clear again that the lower court 
abused its discretion in granting such relief. Plaintiff 
sought only to continue a business relationship that bestowed 
a benefit upon both parties. Certainly in a "balancing" 
context, (see page 21, Respondent's Brief for the 4-prongs of 
the injunctive test), the need for the relief was 
established. 
Considering the three remaining points of prevailing, 
harm and jurisdiction (uncontested), it is not established 
that the trial court could not have reasonably believed in 
the possibility of an eventual victory by Plaintiff or an 
irreparable harm to his livelihood or reputation through loss 
of his co-op membership. As such, there is no reason for 
this Court to strike the lower courts injunctive remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the lower courts denial of attorney's fees was not 
an abuse of discretion, it should be affirmed by this Court. 
Defendants are not entitled to such fees because no basis 
statutory or contractual exists therefor. Defendants acts do 
not meet the condition precedent of enforcing the contract, 
and their attempted recission of the contract precludes them 
from recovery thereunder. The issues are not mooted by 
Defendants subsequent acts, and the possibility of 
-5-
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Justifications for the lower court's injunctions mandate 
against it being dissolved. 
Respectfully submitted this Respectruily ^uomittea tnis 
UU) day of J*y^^ , 1984 
WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ 
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